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In responding to the Second Vatican Council’s call for a renewal in 
moral theological reflection, Servais Pinckaers, Benedict Ashley, and 
Romanus Cessario, all Dominicans, are engaged in the earnest labour 
of authentically interpreting that call to renewal via a systematic 
examination of the sources of ethics contained in Sacred Scripture, 
Tradition, and natural reason. 
The years since the Second Vatican Council have seen many 
divergent trends i n  moral method, not least the adoption of a 
widespread adherence to the methodology of proportionalism, 
particularly in the United States.’ The above mentioned Dominicans 
reject such a method as being incompatible with those crucial sources 
of our faith. In contrast to the popularity of proportionalism, they are 
engaged in a quiet, patient, and determined project, centred on virtue 
theory, that is gradually bearing fruit. 
In Sources of Christian Ethics, Pinckaers tackles the distorted 
picture of an ethic based solely on the demands of obligation.2 The 
search for the minimal content of obligation in  Christian ethics has 
been corruptive of a fully integrated approach to ethical 
understanding, and its latent effects are manifested in the minimalism 
of proportionalism that reduces the moral life to a form of quasi- 
technical calculus based on the will of the acting subject. Quite 
simply, proportionalism as a method seems incapable of adequately 
accounting for our profound sense of personal integrity, and with it, 
the control we exercise over the constitution of our character 
expressed in virtuous and unvirtuous conduct. 
Understanding of our acts operates on two layers. The first layer 
is the externally observable act. The second layer, lying near the 
centre of our being, goes much deeper. It stems from our capacity to 
reflect upon ourselves, our personal dispositions, intentions, and 
feelings. Here we are at the core of our being expressed in the biblical 
metaphor of the heart. This is where the virtues have their place, as 
personal dispositions to do good and avoid evil. 
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When St Thomas Aquinas appeals to the profound effects of 
certain choices upon the character of the acting person, he is 
implicitly rejecting the ability of proportionalism to accommodate the 
organic unity in our actions that gives a person a profound sense that 
it is a life of authorship that they are living, a life that is integral to 
them and their character. 
Proportionalism states that an action can be considered right or 
wrong depending on the nature of the state-of-affairs it would 
p r o d ~ c e . ~  We are not essentially concerned with the interior 
disposition of the agent when considering right and wrong acts. By 
weighing the various values and goods being sought, the agent 
focuses on the proportion acknowledged between the good and bad 
effects, with a view to the greater good or lesser evil actually possible 
in a particular ~i tuat ion.~ In this way, an act which seems to contradict 
an exceptionless moral norm, by directly violating “pre-moral” goods, 
could be qualified as morally acceptable, if calculation is focused on 
the pre-moral balance judged to be decisive. 
Proportionalism tends to assume a theory of action that is 
practically indistinguishable from main stream consequentialism. Its 
features are aptly summed by John Finnis. It consists of a possible 
state-of-affairs to realize; a plan to bring about that state-of-affairs; 
and a series of performances to bring about the desired resuk5 There 
is a clear central flaw running throughout the methodology of 
proportionalism. As a method i t  divorces us from the dynamic 
interiority of moral character. Judgement of actions is made at the 
pre-moral phase by an adjustment of circumstances and means to the 
end, i n  a kind of quasi-technical calculus. If we were to take 
proportionalism seriously as a practical method for the moral life it 
would seem to entail just  such a destructive impact upon our 
constitutive sense of character by reducing character to a form of 
cost-benefit analysis. 
Pinckaers, Ashley, and Cessario all realize the dangers proposed 
by such a method. In contrast, they all stress the unique and 
integrated aspects of a life well conducted in imitation of Christ and 
centred on the virtues. This is of course the project of St Thomas, a 
central source for renewal in the Tradition of the Church. Intrinsic 
evil, for example, is rendered sensible precisely because of the 
interior effects it has on the character of the acting person-an act’s 
“first consequence”. Certain choices and habits of action are fulfilling 
of us and embrace the good, in a way that only virtuous conduct can 
account for. Such a divorce from this interior aspect of the moral life 
will only result in an impoverished legalism that stresses the external 
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conformity of behaviour without needing to address the deeper roots 
of morally good conduct. As Karol Wojtyla has stated, our freely 
chosen acts do not merely produce a change outside of oneself, but 
also are decisions about oneself, a life set for or against the good, the 
truth and ultimately for or against God.6 
Pinckaers, returning to the basic sources, turns to St Paul as an 
exponent of an integrated, distinctively Christian calling. St Paul 
embraces the natural wisdom of human kind in the form of the 
virtues. However, the supernatural virtues of faith, hope, and love, 
call the Christian faithful to a higher level of human perfection. Grace 
transforms the hardness of human hearts and God is seen to be 
intimately involved in the redemption of human kind through the 
operation of the infused virtues. 
It is this unique life in  Christ that leads St Paul to reject a 
corrupting over-emphasis on legalism that leads all too readily to 
forms of laxism and a neglect of underlying goods. It also gives 
direction to the natural virtues that can degenerate and lead to the 
kinds of vice that the pagan civilizations of Greece and Rome were 
prone to. 
Renedict Ashley, in his book, Living the Truth in Love, focuses 
on the supernatural virtues as the unique gift of God, standing in 
intimate relation to the natural virtues, perfecting them onto a higher 
plain of reality.’ Grace perfects what humanity had corrupted through 
that first sin of Eden. The relationship of the supernatural to the 
natural virtues is reflected in the organization of Ashley’s text into a 
triadic structure centred on faith, hope, and love. 
Ashley, as with Pinckaers, and Cessario, is committed to the 
notion that human nature, in the form of the virtues extolled by the 
Greeks, is an integral part of the moral wisdom of the New 
Testament. In his approach to the interpretation of Christian ethics he 
strives to be faithful to the synthesizing genius of St Thomas 
Aq u i n as. 
In their historical analysis, Pinckaers and Ashley, are seeking to 
explain the undue emphasis on obligation that is said to have arisen 
from the voluntarist position of William of Ockham. Their work is an 
attempt to explain the trend that moved towards excessive attention to 
rules and duties that distanced them from the teleological nature of 
the goods that underpin all norms. There is a forceful delineation of 
this trend and an attempt to get back to the kind of synthetic approach 
St Thomas adopted between the virtues and the natural law written on 
human hearts. 
Throughout, there is a common exhortation, that, if we are to 
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proceed with a more adequate way of doing moral theology we need 
to get back to the kind of Thomistic approach that has been such a 
fruitful source of inquiry in the life of the Church.# 
Cessario’s book, The Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics, 
similarly represents a contribution to the movement of rediscovering 
the role of the moral and theological virtues in the lives of the 
Christian f a i t h f ~ l . ~  The use of virtue theory is seen as possessing 
greater explanatory powers in  accounting for the uniquely distinctive 
aspects of leading a life modelled on Christ. We are called to a new 
life in Christ. This represents the unique infusion of God’s grace into 
the heart of the converted, strengthened through the sacramental life 
of the Church. The New Testament is full of examples where this new 
life in Christ adds a transforming dimension to a life well lived 
through the way of Christ’s passion on the Cross. 
Pinckaers, Ashley, and Cessario are engaged in a dedicated 
attempt, along with others, to re-engage an ethics of virtue in order to 
explain the correspondences and departures between a secular life and 
a distinctively Christian life. This is represented in the model of 
Christ himself, who, as God made flesh, shows us how the divine end 
of our life transforms the realities of the natural world-grace 
perfects nature towards our final end. 
The theological virtues of faith, hope, and love are not simply 
optional extras grafted on to the natural life. Rather, they stand as 
powerful vehicles for the transformation of the interior life of the 
faithful, and illuminate the natural virtues by showing the true end for 
humanity-union with God in eternal life. 
Pinckaers, Ashley, and Cessario stress the unique and integrated 
aspects of a life lived well in Christ. Such a life demands much more 
from the individual than external conformity to the rules of the Ten 
Commandments. As St Paul reminds us, there is a fundamental need 
for conversion of the heart. 
Our authors point out that, despite its attempt to offer some 
flexibility in  how a moral life can be led, the school of thought known 
as proportionalism is really only another form of creeping legalism, to 
conform to or grant dispensations from rules, and with it a 
concomitant stress on conscience as a form of escape clause in an 
otherwise binding set of contracts. If we are to break free of this 
mind-set, the fullness of Christian living must be engaged in a life of 
virtue, which is a life of integrated human flourishing. Certain 
choices and habits of action are fulfilling of us and embrace the good 
in a way that only virtuous conduct can account for. 
I was looking recently at a book on the paintings of the 
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Renaissance, and it struck me most powerfully that what our 
Dominican Friars have i n  mind, is more truly represented by 
Michelangelo’s frescoes on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel than the 
medieval two- dimensional images of God as King and Lawmaker 
sitting upon the throne of judgement. The dimension of perspective 
adds shape and form to the depiction of God. This might stretch the 
metaphor to breaking point. However, the creative act of God 
imparting His Goodness and plenitude to the world, to Adam, is 
inherently more creative and dynamic that the image of God as some 
sort of sovereign feudal lord. Proportionalist authors may well be 
surprised to find that their moral method may actually more 
compatible with just such a two-dimensional image! 
We are made in the image and likeness of God. We have the 
capacity to know the good and cultivate it in our hearts. Through our 
capacity for wisdom, we are able to discern the design of the 
Creator-the eternal telos-a plan for how we should conduct our 
lives. God’s gift of faith to us helps us to overcome the clouds of 
forgetfulness that is the condition of original sin. 
How then can we fulfil the ends that God has given to us? Quite 
simply, it is to use the capacities that we possess to the correct ends 
that we are given in our natures, creatively and dynamically, as 
indeed God Himself is creative and dynamic. It is to the merit of our 
authors and their precursors (such as Josef Pieper) that we can 
understand more fully the call to virtuous living as a never-ending 
process towards excellence, authentic self-realization, and ultimately 
beatitude. lo 
As we have already recognized, all three of our authors draw 
heavily upon the teaching of St Thomas to unfold the forms of the 
virtues that incorporate this “synergy” of Christian living. We are 
given appetites-vegetative, animal, rational, and spiritual. Any 
account of the ethical life that does not recognize that there is a 
normative anthropology, is bound either to exalt bare rationality, as 
Kant did, or, exalt desire alone, as the Romantics did. However, we 
are a unity of the different dimensions of the life we are given. The 
form of the virtues seems to account for this unitative aspect of our 
nature in a way that avoids contrary forms of reductionism. 
Prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance, are the cardinal 
natural virtues that guide us on the path of life. These virtues do not 
stand alone but rather dynamically relate to the supernatural virtues. 
In the life of the faithful, these supernatural virtues carry the cardinal 
virtues to greater heights. Thus, temperance, for example, is given 
added dimensionality in the life of the faithful via abstinence during 
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Lent. Natural prudence is augmented and elevated by grace via the 
guidance of the Holy Spirit. Courage, to resist temptation under fire, 
in the face of persecution, is heightened. Witness here the lives of the 
blessed martyrs who resist the denial of faith when natural virtue 
seems to lose its capacity to hold steadfastly to the truth that is God. 
Faith, hope, and love help us to overcome the fissures of confusion 
where our unassisted nature alone seems to fail. 
When reflecting upon the nature of the virtues, it seems fitting 
that we should look to the lives of the saints that God has called to the 
ranks of the blessed. St Thomas More, for example, was able, through 
God’s grace, to hold with fortitude to the witness of the Church and 
not deny the sacramental realities of the faith in marriage, or the 
fidelity owed to Peter’s successors.” This brings into unique relief the 
role of the Church in guiding us to our end of union with God. 
Pinckaers, Ashley, and Cessario all stress that a life of virtue 
enables us to understand how we can live up to the great challenges 
of life that confront us all. Virtues impregnate the moral life with a 
dynamic meaning in a way that moral life is not “forced” but creative 
and rewarding-rewarding because authentic flourishing enables us 
to see the unity in a life well lived: God’s call to us and our response. 
Given the full dimension of our nature, a life of virtue enables us 
to act imaginatively in response to our ends: ends that God has given 
us because they are good as He is good. A life that integrates the 
virtues under the guidance of prudence enables us to grasp its 
profoundly creative dimensions of friendship, love, trust, and fidelity. 
The fullness of marriage, for example, cannot simply be understood 
as an imposition of laws and rules. To be fulfilled, impregnated with 
authentic meaning, in a manner somewhat analogous to the pouring 
forth of God’s creativity, it calls us to embrace justice in domestic 
relationships, temperance when passion sometimes seems to 
overwhelm our measure of appropriateness, fortitude and mutual 
support in the face of failing health. 
Habitus is the cultivation of appropriate interior states of 
relationality to the call of the good manifested in  the ends of our 
created lives. It is a shaping of our life in co-operation with God’s 
plan. Peter Kreeft has summed up well the operation of habitus in his 
book Back to Virtue. There was a man in Times Square, New York, 
who had a violin case under his arm. The young man asked a nearby 
policeman “How can I get to Carnegie Hall’?’’ The policeman 
answered “Practice, man, practice.”!12 
A life well led must integrate the narrative of episode into a 
weaved framework of meaning and context ordained to the summum 
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banum. Prudence is the guiding light that seeks to direct us into a 
coherent whole that is real because it is creatively ordered to ends that 
fulfi l  us. Prudence, therefore, enables us to form the harmonious 
correspondence in our own lives that orders us  to understand our 
authentic purposes and realize them within ourselves. Ultimately, it is 
only with God’s help via the infusion of the supernatural virtues that 
we can fully realize the harmony necessary to grasp this interior 
goodness, not with the iron rod of external threat, but with a tender 
openness of heart to God’s call. 
As Benedict Ashley writes: “Christian moral wisdom is to be 
found not merely in particular good acts, but in the character of a 
person who has the constant capacity to live as a Christian day in and 
day out in all kinds of circumstances. As Jesus says in the Sermon on 
the Mount, ‘A good tree cannot bear bad fruit, nor can a rotten tree 
bear good fruit”’ (Mt 7:18).13 
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